Climate Treaty & Negotiations (Part 1 of 2)
*********************************************************************
******************** EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ********************
This SSI Information Update launches our expanded focus on global
climate change. UCS, along with our climate change allies, believes
there is an unprecedented window of opportunity to bring to fruition
an international agreement that will significantly reduce
heat-trapping gas emissions -- thus averting or at least mitigating
the impacts of global climate change.
This window opened last July at Geneva when the United States
announced its intention to seek legally binding targets and timelines
for reducing emissions. With this change in the US position, most of
the world then signaled its willingness to get serious about climate
change. The nations of the world now have exactly one year to decide
what goal they ultimately will achieve, as well as what specific
strategies will be used and what policies need to be enacted to get us
to the goal. The parties to the climate treaty meet again in December
1997 in Kyoto, Japan to finalize the negotiations.
Over the next twelve months, SSI will identify occasions when
scientists can influence this important policy debate. We will let you
know when climate science is under attack and will keep you informed
of national and international policy developments. We will provide
opportunities to strengthen your media and advocacy skills and will
diligently seek chances for meaningful action. Active and relentless
participation by the scientific community is required to ensure that a
significant international agreement is reached.
Thus, SSI's climate work will broaden beyond the science to include
policy recommendations consistent with the science. We recognize that
some of you may be uneasy in the policy arena, or may perhaps feel
uncomfortable endorsing the specific policy solutions that UCS
recommends. If this is the case, there is still opportunity for your
participation -- much work remains to be done in the science arena as
the climate skeptics continue their onslaught against the scientific
conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
We hope you will join us in this endeavor, whether your particular
focus is on the science, the policy, or both.
This information update sets the context for the upcoming series of
three international preparatory meetings leading up to Kyoto. The
first meeting will take place in Geneva from December 9 - 18, 1996.
The update covers the following topics:
** Background on the climate treaty and the IPCC's first scientific
assessment.
** A description of the major developments at the first two
Conferences of the Parties.
** An initial look at where the upcoming negotiations may be moving.
** A quick assessment of likely strategies opponents of climate change
action will use to prevent a meaningful international treaty.
** A list of references and Internet Resources
Please note that the policy positions outlined in this update are
works in progress. We are using this forum to give SSI members a
sense of the important issues and possible responses to them. But
discussions among our NGO allies and among country delegations are
preliminary and will undoubtedly be revised, refined, and adjusted.
Knowing that you can appreciate the evolving nature of the
discussions, we ask you not to distribute this document, including no
electronic postings.
We look forward to your comments and suggestions on this SSI priority
focus.
****************************************
THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE: PAST AND
FUTURE
A briefing update produced by Darren Goetze, staff scientist, Union of
Concerned Scientists
**Origins and the Role of Science
The 1992 United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) came as a direct result of the research findings of the
scientific community. Though the theory of global warming due to CO2
release to the atmosphere is more than a century old, during the 1980s
scientists' journal papers and books noted with increasing alarm the
potentially serious consequences of changing global climate by an
anthropogenic enhancement of the greenhouse effect. In an effort to
examine the question systematically, the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in
1988 established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
in 1988. This panel was charged with reporting on the state of the
science of climate change, the human role in it, and the possible
impacts it might have. Within two years, the IPCC produced its First
Assessment Report (FAR; IPCC, 1990) which warned that a doubling of
carbon dioxide (CO2) concentration in the atmosphere would raise
global mean surface temperatures by 1.5-4.5 degrees C (3-8 degrees F)
within a century. The consequences of this would be rising sea levels,
increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events, and
serious ecological pressure on aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.
The FAR spurred policymakers to negotiate an international climate
change treaty in time for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED - a.k.a. the Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro.
Signed by 165 states, the agreement produced at that time was merely a
"framework" Convention -- a foundation for action that initially
provided for non-binding commitments (Article 4) only until the year
2000. The most concrete commitment was that developed countries would
stabilize their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by the year 2000.
Although it was clear that such short-term action would not
sufficiently address the risks of climate change, the Framework
Convention clearly stated its long-term purpose:
"The ultimate objective... is to achieve...stabilization of
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to
allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that
food production is not threatened and to enable economic development
to proceed in a sustainable manner." (Article 2)
By defining its objective clearly and obligating the signatory
countries (known as the Parties to the Convention) to regular review
of the adequacy of the treaty terms in reference to the evolving
science of climate change, the Convention established a basis for
future strengthening of commitments. Since the Earth Summit, over 100
countries have ratified the UNFCCC, including the United States, and
so are legally bound by it. The treaty took effect on 21 March 1994.
**A Useful Foundation
As with many international treaties, the onus for living up to the
commitments agreed to is on the countries themselves. So far, the
results produced by UNFCCC have not been inspiring. Developed
countries, with the possible exceptions of the United Kingdom and
(united) Germany, will not meet the most modest goal of GHG emission
stabilization to 1990 levels by 2000. Indeed, in most countries,
emissions continue to rise. Initial 1995 estimates for the United
States, released by the Energy Information Administration, show that
energy-related carbon emissions alone rose by 4.8 percent compared
with 1990 (see Laitner, 1995). Unsurprisingly, the UNFCCC has been
criticized in many corners for being ineffective and allowing
countries to escape their commitments without penalty.
The treaty has nevertheless made three significant steps towards a
lasting solution on climate change. First, it formally recognizes that
there is a problem. The significance of this cannot be underestimated.
Other environmental problems have highlighted the difficulties of
getting nations to agree on priorities and an international course of
action; in this case, they agreed to tackle a problem whose
consequences are uncertain and will have more impact on our
grandchildren than on the present generation.
Second, the treaty produced a relevant criteria for action. In
establishing its "ultimate objective" of GHG stabilizing at atmospheric
concentrations that would prevent "dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system," the treaty did not attempt to define a precise
concentration goal. It simply stated that that climate change should not
be allowed to become "dangerous." In 1992, the IPCC advised policymakers
that scientists believed it would take about another decade (and the next
generation of supercomputers) before many uncertainties could be
significantly reduced. Thus, the scientific uncertainty of what
constitutes a dangerous concentration level is tacitly acknowledged, but
the Convention's objective remains meaningful no matter how the science
evolves.
Third, the UNFCCC established a highly relevant timeframe for action.
It directs that GHG stabilization should happen within a sufficient
timeframe to allow natural adaptation of ecosystems to climate change,
to protect food production, and to enable sustainable economic
development in developing countries. This highlights the main concerns
about food production -- probably the most climate-sensitive human
activity -- and economic development. It also suggests (as most
climatologists believe) that some change is inevitable and that
adaptive as well as preventive measures are warranted. Again, this
leaves room for interpretation in the light of scientific findings and
the trade-offs and risks that the global community is willing to
accept.
**Strengthening the Commitment
Given that the Framework Convention on
Climate Change started out as a general treaty with just a few specific
requirements covering a very short time period, it is of paramount
importance that the treaty continue to evolve. The treaty provides for
periodic Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings which bring together all
the signatory nations. Since the signing of the UNFCCC, there have been
two COP meetings, one in Berlin in April, 1995 and one this past summer in
Geneva. Though both COP meetings were characterized by enormous volumes of
rhetoric and paper, each meeting also took meaningful steps towards
strengthening the UNFCCC.
The Berlin Mandate
The first meeting of the COP produced the Berlin Mandate, which called
for negotiation of binding commitments by industrial countries to
reduce their heat-trapping gas emissions after the year 2000. The
Parties scheduled a series of negotiating sessions over the next two
years to try to conclude such an agreement by the third meeting of the
COP in December, 1997. Over the next year, industrial country
governments will conduct analyses of the economic and environmental
effects of the policies and measures necessary to meet various
emissions-reduction objectives by dates, such as 2005, 2010, and 2020.
In the United States, this analysis will primarily be conducted by the
Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection Agency, with
review from other agencies and the White House, and coordinated by
Undersecretary of Commerce Everet Ehrlich.
The Berlin meeting also saw the emergence of a group of countries
known as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) as the moral
conscience of the negotiations. Many of these countries -- such as
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Singapore -- are only a few meters
above sea level, and some are along well-defined tropical storm
corridors. They worry that their very existence is threatened in the
face of possible increases in sea level and extreme weather event
frequency. Even before the COP-1 meeting, they had called upon
industrial countries to cut their emissions of heat-trapping gases by
20 percent below 1990 levels by the year 2005. UCS and most
environmental organizations active on climate issues endorsed this
ambitious goal. In contrast, the US delegation acknowledged the need
for a post-2000 aim for the climate treaty, but was not prepared to
commit to particular specifics.
In addition, the US called for expanding opportunities to contribute
to the effort to combat climate change, through unspecified actions by
the larger and more quickly industrializing of the developing
countries, such as China and Indonesia. This suggestion raised fears
among developing countries that the US wanted to impose quantitative
emissions commitments on them that would seriously impede their
ability to industrialize. In the end, the Berlin COP addressed this
issue by calling on developing countries to advance the implementation
of their existing commitments under the treaty but did not require new
developing countries' commitments, such as the binding emissions
targets and timetables proposed for industrial countries.
In parallel, the United States and other industrial countries promoted
the concept of Joint Implementation (JI), which would allow industrial
countries to meet part of their emissions-reduction commitments
through public or private sector investments in developing countries.
They argued that such investments are often more cost-effective than
measures in the investing country itself. For example, a utility
building a coal plant in the United States might seek to offset the
carbon dioxide emissions from that plant by investing in
energy-efficiency measures in Poland or reforestation projects in
Costa Rica. Many developing countries and environmental groups view JI
skeptically because they suspect it could end up merely postponing the
more fundamental changes needed in industrial countries' consumption
of fossil fuels. In an effort to build confidence in JI, the Berlin
conference established criteria for JI projects to be initiated during
a pilot phase, not to last beyond the year 2000. The emissions
reductions from these projects cannot be credited against existing
commitments under the treaty. Post-2000 crediting rules will be the
subject of intense negotiations.
The Geneva Declaration
The second COP meeting this past July moved the goal of a strong
international climate change treaty a significant step toward reality.
In the most important breakthrough since the Earth Summit, the
overwhelming majority of the world's environment and foreign ministers
approved a strong ministerial declaration that signaled that there is
now broad international support for legally binding targets to reduce
heat-trapping gas emissions. Known as the Geneva Declaration, the
document advances the treaty process beyond the 1995 Berlin Mandate in
three important respects:
First, it strongly endorsed the conclusions reached by the scientific
assessment report produced by the IPCC's Second Assessment Report
(SAR; IPCC, 1995; see SSI Climate Change Reference Guide Update: The
Advancing Science of Climate Change). The SAR had been under concerted
attack by fossil fuel industry lobbyists and OPEC countries since it
was released in late 1995, but the ministers specifically pointed out
that the IPCC's work was the "most comprehensive and authoritative
assessment of the science of climate change, its impacts and response
options now available" and it provided "a scientific basis for
urgently strengthening action ... to limit and reduce emissions of
GHGs." Second, the Geneva Declaration accepted the IPCC assertion that
the continued rise in atmospheric GHG concentrations "will lead to
dangerous interference with the climate system." This is highly
significant in light of the language of the Framework Convention's
Article 2. Lastly, the Declaration called on the negotiators to
accelerate their work to complete a text of a binding protocol, one
including provisions for "legally binding" objectives and
"significant" reductions -- that is, binding targets and timetables --
to reduce future GHG emissions, in time to be signed at the third COP
meeting to be held in Kyoto, Japan in December, 1997.
A major shift in the US negotiating position was key to galvanizing
support among industrialized countries for seriously strengthening the
climate. The new and unexpected position announced by Under Secretary
of State for Global Affairs Timothy Wirth advanced the standing of the
concept of a legally binding commitment. It was too much for some;
Australia and New Zealand expressed reservations about the need for
legally-binding emissions cuts, while the OPEC countries and Russia
dissented altogether from the Geneva Declaration. But those countries
who joined the US -- including Canada, the European Union, and Japan
-- have demonstrated the political will to reduce GHG emissions
through more substantial requirements and commitments, either by
further amendments to the UNFCCC or by a stronger document, perhaps
modeled on the successful Montreal Protocol.
**The Road Ahead
With the explicit instructions in the Geneva Declaration, the current
negotiating round is likely to culminate in a meaningful climate
treaty at the December 1997 COP-3 meeting in Kyoto, Japan. To meet
that ambitious schedule, countries are likely to begin scoping
proposals for meaningful "quantified legally-binding objectives for
emission limitations and significant overall reductions within
specified time frames" at the first preparatory meetings in December
in Geneva. They will also need to begin discussions on issues such as
emissions trading, JI, and the role of developing countries. UCS will
evaluate the country proposals not only on their overall environmental
merit but also on their specific, and possibly more contentious,
aspects, such as emissions trading among nations and JI. Two features
UCS would like to see in the final agreement are discussed below:
A Focus on Carbon
Many gases, both naturally- and anthropogenically-sourced, contribute
to the greenhouse effect, including CO2, CH4, N2O, chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), and
tropospheric O3. However, CO2 makes the largest contribution to
climate forcing as a result of its increased concentration in the
atmosphere (see Schimel et al., 1995 for discussion). Furthermore, the
available data characterizing anthropogenic emissions and atmospheric
rate of change are by far the best for CO2. Because human-related
emissions of this gas are integrally linked to economic activity
involving fossil fuels, forestry, and land use changes, CO2 emissions
data can be constructed from such sources as oil imports, gasoline
consumption, tree harvesting, etc. Data estimates for other gases are
often highly uncertain -- for example, Canada's estimate for N2O
emissions was plus/minus 40 percent at the 85 percent confidence
level. Monitoring of atmospheric concentrations of CO2 is also
qualitatively better than for other gases. Scientists have empirically
monitored atmospheric CO2 since the 1950s, and other highly reliable
records can be established through indirect techniques. For all these
reasons, CO2 should be the primary focus of legally-binding emissions
reductions requirements in the new round of negotiations. For other
GHGs, countries should be expected to use "best practices" to reduce
emissions, and requirements should be strengthened as emissions and
atmospheric data improve.
The Long Term Goal
The ultimate goal is the single most important variable in formulating
any emissions reduction strategy. This goal can be defined in many
ways, using criteria of ecological impact or rate of global mean
surface temperature or even a simple atmospheric concentration limit.
The first two options are difficult to measure quantitatively and may
result in an unacceptable degree of climate change occurring. In
contrast, the last option allows for effective monitoring and
empirical studies can be used to inform what level of concentration
target should be set.
Reliable paleoclimatic data shows that global mean temperature has not
varied by more than 1 degree C in a century at any point in the last
10,000 years (see Nicholls et al., 1995). Prior to this, there is
evidence of large magnitude climate alterations over very short
periods of time. For example, 11,500 years ago Central Greenland
warmed approximately 7 degrees C in a few decades, and surface
temperature in the Norwegian Sea changed by approximately 5 degrees C
in less than 40 years. Such changes are not unusual in the
paleoclimatic record data and they demonstrate that, under some
circumstances, global climate can be extremely volatile. Scientists do
not fully understand the exact circumstances and contributing factors
although they recognize that the pattern of trade winds, thermohaline
circulation (the so-called Great Ocean Conveyor; see Broecker, 1995
for review), and solar output (Haigh, 1996; Kerr, 1996) are all major
factors. Of these, only the former two are susceptible to internal
forcing, such as by altering the current thermal equilibrium structure
of the atmosphere by human-related enhancement of the greenhouse
effect. Destabilization of either atmospheric or ocean circulation, or
both, would certainly constitute "a dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system."
Unfortunately, the limits of sensitivity of the current atmospheric
equilibrium are not empirically well characterized -- that is, it is
not clear how much extra heat energy the system can retain before it
becomes profoundly destabilized. Looking backwards in time, the
paleo-record suggests that the current atmospheric equilibrium has
restrained the global mean temperature (GMT) from varying by more than
1 degrees C in a century. It seems reasonable then, that the ultimate
aim of a climate treaty should be to contain GMT from variations
outside its recent historical range.
The results of modeling work done by Raper et al. (1996) provides
evidence that stabilizing atmospheric CO2 at 450 ppmv (parts per
million by volume; current level is approximately 360 ppmv) by 2100
could limit global mean temperature increases to approximately 1
degree C or less, even if climate sensitivity is as high as 2.5
degrees C. [Climate sensitivity refers to the eventual equilibrium
global mean temperature that results in a climate model simulation
from a doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentrations (550 ppmv). Thus,
the higher the climate sensitivity of a model, the more warming it
predicts from a 2xCO2 atmosphere. The IPCC's "best estimate" of
climate sensitivity is 2.5 degrees C (Kattenberg et al., 1995)]. Bear
in mind that this model only takes CO2 into consideration, and actual
warming will probably be higher due to increases in other greenhouse
gases, such as methane, nitrous oxide, and HCFCs/HFCs. Considered
together, a 450 ppmv CO2 concentration along with these other gases
would result in a so-called "carbon equivalent" concentration of
approximately 520-530 ppmv CO2. Exactly how much more is dependent on
climate sensitivity.
Furthermore, the same authors' work suggests 450 ppmv could still
result in sea level rises as high as 90 cm (35 in) over the next 300
years. Such a concentration would therefore not be without
consequences, but the findings suggest their relative magnitude would
be diminished. Overall this work, and others, give us an indication
that it may yet be possible to hold climate change, at least in terms
of temperature, to a level that doesn't grossly exceed known
historical trends. Given the potential impacts of climate change,
simple risk assessment suggests that "450 by 2100" would be an
appropriate long term target for the UNFCCC given the current state of
climate change science. Future improvements in the understanding of
climate sensitivity, the predicted forcing due to given atmospheric
concentrations, and coupled transient general circulation models of
climate could necessitate altering the concentration target
numerically. However, minimizing the risk of climate change will
remain a guiding principle.
An advantage of defining a long-term atmospheric target is that it
sheds light on the medium term emissions target and timetables
necessary to meet it. Achieving a 450 ppmv CO2 stabilization by 2100
would be a formidable task, but a number of analyses suggest it is
nonetheless entirely attainable. The analysis shown in IPCC
(Kattenberg et al., 1995), in Wigley et al. (1995), and in subsequent
refinements by Wigley's co-authors (see Masood, 1996) shows that once
an atmospheric CO2 target is decided, it is possible to define the
global CO2 emission trajectory necessary to achieve it. Based on such
trajectories and accounting for currently realities (i.e. continued
increases in CO2 emissions from most nations), it would be possible to
define more exactly what medium term targets and timetables are
necessary to meet a 450 ppmv CO2 goal.
The opponents of meaningful action on climate change have forcefully
resisted the UNFCCC process. Most recently, industry groups, such as
the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) and the Western Fuels Association
(WFA), tried desperately to undermine the IPCC's SAR. With the help of
the Marshall Institute and the professionally skeptical Science and
Environmental Policy Project, they attempted to discredit the
scientific validity of the SAR by persistently accusing the IPCC of
trivial procedural improprieties. In the process, they attacked the
reputation of one of America's most respected climate scientists, Dr.
Ben Santer. Of course, the allegations were completely baseless and
unfounded, but the skeptics hoped the general public would be left
wondering about the IPCC's integrity.
Governments, however, were not amused, and they categorically swept
the GCC's allegations aside. In Geneva, they affirmed their confidence
in the IPCC's integrity and assessment of climate. The GCC and
similarly minded groups are unlikely to give up though; instead, they
are simply changing their tactics. Since trying to debase the science
backfired at home and abroad, they are trying to convince Americans
that it is too costly to do anything about climate change. As
evidence, they point to economic models showing that effective
emissions reduction measures will be hugely expensive, will damage the
economy, and will cost hundreds of thousands of jobs.
The opponents of climate change action base their economic conclusions
on deeply flawed models. They assume that the only way to pursue
emissions reductions is by an enormous carbon tax. In fact, the US and
other countries are more likely to use a range of fiscal, research,
informational, incentive, and regulatory policies to achieve
cost-effective emissions reductions. The models also grossly
underestimate the capacity of America's economy to achieve the kind of
technical innovations we've seen in the past in response to other major
environmental problems. Once national standards have been set --
whether to reduce air pollution, improve water quality or protect the
ozone layer -- American business and industry have proven quite
resourceful at implementing cost-effective solutions. Those solutions
have created hundreds of thousands of new jobs and improved
competitiveness in global markets. Why should climate change be any
different?
In case these scare tactics aren't enough to block action on climate
change, the industry lobbies are readying another line of defense:
that there's no point in cutting US GHG emissions because, in any
event, growing emissions from large developing countries like China
and India will more than make up for any abatement Americans achieve.
While developing country emissions are growing, this argument ignores
the vast discrepancy in per capita emissions and levels of economic
development between wealthy countries like the United States and
developing countries like India. It also disregards the fact that the
atmospheric buildup of greenhouse gases over the last 100 years has
been almost entirely due to the industrial activity of the US and
other developed countries, and that, for at least the next several
decades, wealthy country emissions will continue to exceed those of
the developing nations. Most importantly, it ignores the "global
bargain" that all serious observers acknowledge will be essential to
averting catastrophic rates of climate change: that once
industrialized countries move decisively to reduce their emissions of
heat-trapping gases, the developing world will accept its
responsibility to adhere to global emissions limits early in the 21st
century. Such a solution would follow the precedent established by the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer.
Also overlooked is that the real cost of clean energy technologies is
actually quite modest in the context of the roughly $2 trillion the
world spends annually on energy. As these clean technologies come to
market, mass production will further reduce their price, putting them
well within reach of developing countries. This will allow these
nations to meet their legitimate development needs without replicating
the industrialized countries' record of building our economies on the
inefficient use of polluting fossil fuels.
**Conclusion
Given what's at stake, activists, voters, and lawmakers need to give
priority to preventing irreparable climate change. The Clinton
administration deserves applause for its new position, and will need
continued encouragement to negotiate an environmentally meaningful
treaty. Credible scientists must convince their fellow citizens that
climate change is real and the need for action is now. The outcome of
the international negotiations depends on a climate change policy that
is driven by a sound scientific understanding and enlightened national
self-interest. Over the next year, leadership on the part of the
scientific community, the Clinton administration, and other nations can
produce a climate treaty that substantially reduces the risk of climate
change.
**References
Broecker WS (1995) Chaotic climate. Scientific American, November,
p62-68.
Haigh JD (1996) The impact of solar variability on climate. Science,
v272, p981-984.
IPCC (1990) Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment. (JT
Houghton, GJ Jenkins and JJ Ephraums, eds.) Cambridge Univ. Press,
Cambridge, UK. pp 365.
IPCC (1995) Climate Change 1995. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK.
In three volumes.
Kattenberg A et al. (1995) Climate models - Projections of future
climate. In: Climate Change 1995. The Science of Climate Change (JT
Houghton, LG Meira Filho, BA Callender, N Harris, A Kattenberg and K
Maskell, eds.). Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK. pp285-357.
Kerr RA (1996) A new dawn for sun-climate links? Science, v271,
p1360-1361.
Laitner S (1995) Energy efficiency and economic indicators: Charting
improvements in the economy and the environment. The American Council
for an Energy Efficient Economy, Washington DC. pp61.
Masood E (1996) Industry warms to 'flexible' carbon cuts. Nature,
v383, p657.
Nicholls N et al. (1995) Observed climate variability and change. In:
Climate Change 1995. The Science of Climate Change (JT Houghton, LG Meira
Filho, BA Callender, N Harris, A Kattenberg and K Maskell, eds.). Cambridge
Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK. pp132-192.
Raper SCB, TML Wigley and RA Warrick (1996) Global sea level rise:
Past and future. In: Rising Sea Level and Subsiding Coastal Areas (JD
Milliman, ed.). Kluwer Acad. Pub., Dordrecht, Holland. pp-384.
Schimel D et al. (1995) Radiative forcing of climate change. In: Climate
Change 1995. The Science of Climate Change (JT Houghton, LG Meira Filho,
BA Callender, N Harris, A Kattenberg and K Maskell, eds.). Cambridge Univ.
Press, Cambridge, UK. pp65-131.
Wigley TML, R Richels and JA Edmonds (1995) Alternative emissions
pathways for stabilizing concentrations. Nature, v379, p240-243.
**Internet Resources
EcoNet's Climate Resources Directory -
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change -
http://www.unep.ch/ipcc/ipcc-0.html
Joint Implementation - http://www.ji.org
Official Website of the Secretariat of the UNFCCC -
http://www.unfccc.de/index.html
Union of Concerned Scientists - http://www.ucsusa.org/
UN Conference on Environment and Development UNCED -
http://unep.unep.no/unep/partners/un/unced/home.htm
United Nations Environment Programme - http://www.unep.ch/
World Meteorological Organization - http://www.wmo.ch/
BACK TO
*********************************************************************