Presented to the Landsat Science Working Group, Marriot=
t Greenbelt,
Greenbelt, Maryland, October 15, 1996
By
E.J. Sheffner
Johnson Controls World Services
NASA Ames Research Center
Moffett Field, CA 94035
Resolving those issues is not the responsibility of this working group, n= or, given the history of Landsat, are long term solutions likely soon. B= ut, near term solutions are emerging, and those solutions will have an ef= fect on your ability to get the data you need. It is worthwhile to revie= w how the Landsat Program evolved regarding the fundamental issues, how t= he current programmatic environment is affecting availability of data and= what is likely to happen with the Landsat Program in the near future. A= lthough you cannot define the nature of the program nor decide how the US= G will procure data, you represent the science community, and the interes= ts of that community can and should be considered. To forward those inter= ests, to develop reasonable and effective positions regarding earth obser= vation from space, you need to be aware of the options available to the c= ommunity and the factors shaping US policy toward earth observations and,= especially, toward Landsat.
Initial Landsat Program
The primary causal factor for the uncertainty and periodic shifts in prog=
ram policy is Landsat's success. The first Landsat satellite was designe=
d, built, launched and operated as an experimental system. It became app=
arent soon after launch, that the data supplied by Landsat 1, especially =
data from the Multispectral Scanner System, the secondary instrument on t=
he platform, was popular and potentially applicable in broad range of inv=
estigations. Through 1974, Landsat 1 transmitted more than 100,000 imag=
es covering 75% of the earth's land surface. More than 300 US and foreig=
n investigators received data. Landsat was a hit =
The US government was un-prepared for the success of Landsat. An effort = to define the nature of the program began in the Administration and Congr= ess in 1973. Was Landsat experimental or operational? The Landsat Progr= am is often compared to the weather satellites. Congress has maintained = a consistent policy toward USG acquisition and distribution of weather sa= tellite data, though that policy has been challenged at times. The distri= bution of weather data was a US government responsibility long before the= first weather satellite was launched. Because of that history, weather = data is accepted as a part of the national infrastructure like the inters= tate highways or national parks. A policy toward acquisition and distrib= ution of weather data acquired from space-based platforms flowed directly= and easily from the history of the Weather Service. But observation of = the land from space was new. Despite the substantial interest shown in s= uch observations in the United States and abroad, despite the technologic= al leadership the US maintained in the field, Congress did not commit in= the early 1970's nor since, to on-going, public sponsorship of acquisit= ion and distribution of earth satellite observations. In other words, Co= ngress has never agreed to fund a public, space-based, operation= al land remote sensing program.
That the first Landsats were built and operated by NASA underscored the a= mbiguity of the program. NASA is an engineering and science agency. NAS= A sponsors research that applies data acquired by experimental systems th= e agency builds and launches; the agency lacks administrative and Congres= sional mandates for operational systems. But most users of Landsat data = are not NASA sponsored scientists, and many, perhaps most, applications o= f Landsat data are not experimental. NASA involvement with Landsat was t= hen, and is today, an administrative anomaly.
Because Congress had to respond to the success of Landsat, because there = was no precedent or existing policy for how an on-going, space-based, ear= th observation program should be managed, and because of the administrati= ve anomaly of Landsat residing within NASA, the programmatic decisions ma= de in "73 and '74 tended to be ad hoc and subject to change based on ideo= logy, expediency and available funding. That environment for decisions h= as remained constant through the program's history.
The decision in 1974 was to continue Landsat as an experimental program t= hrough 1979. NASA and the Department of the Interior were assigned respo= nsibility for acquisition and distribution of the data. Under those term= s, Landsat 2 was launched in 1975, Landsat 3 in 1978.
Commercialization
In 1979, a review of the program by the Carter Administration led to Pres=
idential Directive 54 - a fresh attempt to plan a long term strategy for=
Landsat. Operation of Landsat was transferred from NASA to NOAA acknowl=
edging that Landsat was an operational system. The directive recommended=
that Landsat be converted to truly operational status by committing to f=
our additional satellites beyond Landsat 3. The directive also included =
the recommendation that, as a long term goal, Landsat be transferred to t=
he private sector, even though the Administration conceded that developme=
nt of a commercially sustainable market for Landsat data was likely to ta=
ke a decade. =
The Reagan administration was sympathetic to commercialization and accele= rated the process for Landsat. However, it rejected the commitment of it= s predecessor to an operational program and advocated the immediate end t= o government funding for Landsat. Efforts to commercialize the program w= hile maintaining data acquisition culminated in the passage of Public Law= 98-365 in 1984, the law that established the instrument for commercializ= ation of Landsat system through contract with NOAA. =
While the legislative machinations were progressing, two new Landsat were= launched, Landsat 4 in 1982 and Landsat 5 in 1984. Both included an MSS= as the primary instrument and a new higher ground resolution device, the= Thematic Mapper, as an experimental instrument. Landsat 5 continues to = operate 12.5 years after launch, having exceeded its design life by a fac= tor of 4. (One action this group may wish to take is to suggest that Mar= ch 1, the annivarsy date for the launch of Landsat 5, be declared a natio= nal holiday.)
In 1985, the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT), a partnership o= f Hughes and RCA, was selected by NOAA to operate the Landsat system unde= r a ten year contract. EOSAT was assigned responsibility to operate Land= sats 4 and 5 at USG expense and build two new satellites, also with USG f= unds. EOSAT was granted exclusive right to market Landsat data collected= prior to the date of the contract through the expiration data (7/16/94) = and data collected after the contract date for 10 years from date of acq= uisition. =
The primary impacts of the commercialization of Landsat data were a subst= antial increase in the price and a loss of control of the acquisition po= licy. Use of data declined with the price increase, and systematic acqui= sition of data was replaced by a policy of acquiring only data requested.=
The 1984 law, and the contract with EOSAT that emerged from it, did not b= ring peace to the program. The remainder of the decade was marked by ann= ual uncertainty within the USG about appropriating funds to meet the gove= rnment's commitments to EOSAT and the data user community and to secure t= he continued acquisition of Landsat data by funding development and launc= h of new systems. Congress released funding for Landsat 6 in 1988, but o= perating funds for Landsats 4 and 5 remained hard to come by. =
Landsat 7
Not until 1992 was an attempt made to address the shortcomings in the pro=
gram resulting from the 1984 law and plan a future for the program beyond=
Landsat 6. In February, the Bush Administration issued National Space P=
olicy Directive #5. The motivation for this policy initiative was in par=
t, at least, a desire to address Landsat's on-going problems and uncertai=
nties. Perhaps of greater interest was the desire to ensure the continu=
ed availability of Landsat data after it had proved its utility in the Gu=
lf War. =
The Directive established a management structure and goals for Landsat. I= t dealt with many issues surrounding the program as it outlined a strateg= y to: =
To implement this strategy, DOC was instructed to complete and launch Lan= dsat 6 and to maintain, through EOSAT, operation of Landsats 4 and 5 unti= l Landsat 6 became operational. Responsibility for Landsat 7 and beyond = was assigned to DoD and NASA. The two organizations were instructed to d= evelop and launch Landsat 7 with performance capabilities at least equal = to Landsat 6,
In March 1992, DoD and NASA signed a management plan for Landsat 7. DoD a= ccepted responsibility for the space segment and NASA assumed responsibil= ity for the ground segment. A budget or $880M for the life of the progra= m was established. =
In response to the management plan, DoD issued a Request for Proposals (R= FP) for Landsat 7 in May 1992. The RFP specified performance requirements= , it did not specify an instrument or instruments. The performance requir= ements included capabilities equivalent to Landsat 6 with the addition of= TDRSS. The RFP also included, for potential bidders to consider adding t= o their proposals, "prioritized enhancements" and "lower priority enhance= ments." The former included improved spatial resolution, improved absolut= e calibration and stereo mapping capability. The latter included addition= al spectral bands, cross-track pointing, improved radiometric sensitivity= and improved line of sight (LOS) accuracy. =
The award for Landsat 7 was given to General Electric (subsequently sold = to Martin Marietta, subsequently to merge into Lockheed Martin) The winni= ng proposal called for two instruments - The Enhanced Thematic Mapper Plu= s (ETM+) as the "continuity" instrument (including the enhancement in LWI= R ground resolution and absolute radiometric calibration noted above), an= d the High Resolution Multispectral Stereo Imager (HRMSI) as an instrumen= t that addressed many of the other performance enhancements described in = the RFP. HRMSI performance characteristics included 4, 10 meter VNIR band= s, a 5 meter panchromatic band, stereo imaging capability and off track p= ointing. =
The contract for Landsat 7 accepted the two instrument concept, but HRMS= I was included as an option to be exercised, i.e., selected or rejected,= by February, 1994. The option arrangement was necessary because neithe= r DoD nor NASA had anticipated a second instrument on the platform or inc= luded funding for a second instrument in the budget for the baseline prog= ram defined in the management plan. Exercising the HRMSI option was depe= ndent on both agencies securing additional funding to cover the anticipat= ed additional cost.
Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992
The award for Landsat 7 brings us to October, 1992 and enactment of the L=
and Remote Sensing Policy Act. That legislation contains the most recent=
directives from Congress on how the Landsat Program should proceed, and =
implementation of the provisions of the law have brought us to this meeti=
ng.
The 1992 law conformed to the history of the program It marked another s= hift in the philosophy of Landsat returning control of the program to the= government sector, at least through Landsat 7. It recognized officially = the importance of data continuity by authorizing Landsat 7, but it left u= ndefined the program after Landsat 7. The law was another attempt to bri= ng order and consistency to the program; but it did not resolve the funda= mental policy issues.
More specifically, the law ratified the actions and followed the recommen= dations of National Space Policy Directive #5. It created an entity call= ed Landsat Program Management consisting of DoD, NASA and any other agenc= y the President selected to serve on it. LPM was directed to establish a= management plan (it already existed) authorized to build, launch and ope= rate Landsat 7, maintain the Landsat system, provide data to the user com= munity at the cost of fulfilling user requests, place copies of Landsat 7= data in the National Satellite Land Remote Sensing Data Archive at EDC, = negotiate a new data policy for Landsat 4-6 with EOSAT, assume Landsat 6 = program responsibilities from NOAA following launch of the system, initia= te a Landsat Advisory Process; conduct a technology demonstration program= , and assess options for a land remote sensing system after Landsat 7. A= ll provisions of the law have been or are currently being implemented. =
Landsat Program Since 1992
Two major events affected the Landsat Program after passage of the 1992 l=
aw. Both occurred in the fall of 1993. First came the loss of Landsat 6 =
in early October. Second was the decision of DoD in December to withdraw=
from the program. The loss of Landsat 6 led to a review of the program =
by OSTP. DoD's withdrawal from the program while the OSTP review was und=
erway broadened the scope of the review and led to a reorganization of th=
e program. The re-organization was announced officially in Presidential =
Decision Directive/NSTC #3 in May, 1994. =
The Administration directive defined the Landsat 7 project as it is now c= onstituted. NASA, assigned in the original management plan responsibilit= y for the Landsat 7 ground segment only, assumed responsibility for the s= pace segment as well. NOAA and USGS were officially added to Landsat Pro= gram Management. NOAA was assigned responsibility for operation of the s= atellite and ground system; USGS was to operate the ground system under N= OAA's direction and archive the data. Under that management structure, t= he Landsat 7 project has gone foward as is doing well as you well hear la= ter this morning. =
When NASA took on responsibility for the Landsat 7 space segment, it made= the ETM+ an EOS instrument and Landsat 7 became part of the EOS program.= That decision was ratified by the EOS payload panel, because, as the pa= nel stated, the availability of Landsat type data was assumed when the EO= S payloads were selected. If a source for such data was not assured, the= n an instrument to collect Landsat type data should be included in EOS. = The decision had no effect on Landsat 7 but it did have an impact on EOS = as space was reserved on the AM-2 platform, scheduled for launch in 2004,= for a Landsat/ETM+ type instrument. =
The 1992 law has remained unchanged since its enactment, but the 104th Co= ngress, just adjourned, came very close to changing and amending it and i= t is likely an attempt will be made again in the 105th regardless of the = outcome of the election next month. On September 17 the House passed the= "Space Commercialization Promotion Act of 1996" and sent it on to the Se= nate where it died short one vote as the legislative clock ran out. That= bill included a section of changes to the 1992 Land Remote Sensing Polic= y Act and another section that addressed directly acquisition of Earth re= mote sensing data. The changes proposed in the 1992 law had no direct im= pact on Landsat 7, but they offer evidence of what Congress may be willin= g to accept in a post Landsat 7 system. For example, the finding in the = 1992 law that reads "Full commercialization of the Landsat Program cannot= be achieved within the foreseeable future, and thus should not serve as = the near term goal of national policy on land remote sensing; however, co= mmercialization of land remote sensing should remain a long term goal of = United States policy," is stricken and replaced by "Commercialization of = land remote sensing is a near-term goal and should remain a long term goa= l of United States policy." In section 301 of the 1992 law, on continued= federal research and development, to the sentence that reads, "The Admin= istrator (NASA) is authorized and encouraged to...develop remote sensing = technologies and techniques, including those needed for monitoring the Ea= rth and its environment," the words "that are not being commercially deve= loped" are added. At the conclusion of that section the following paragr= aph is added: "The federal government shall not undertake activities unde= r this section which duplicate activities available from the commercial s= ector, unless such activities would result in significant cost savings to= the federal government." Section 303 of the 1992 law authorizing the Pr= esident to conduct a technology demonstration program is stricken in its = entirety. That section is part of, at least, the justification for NASA'= s New Millennium Program under which the EO-1 instrument, a potential pre= cursor for a Landsat 7 follow-on, is being built. =
Section 202 of the Space Commercialization Promotion Act addresses earth = remote sensing. The first paragraph states, "For purposes of meeting gov= ernment goals for Mission to Planet Earth, the Administrator shall, to th= e maximum extent possible and while fully satisfying the scientific requi= rements of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, acquire, wh= ere cost effective, space based and airborne remote sensing data, service= s, distribution and applications from the private sector. " The administ= rator is also called upon to undertake a study, due 9 months after enactm= ent of the law, to determine the extent to which the baseline scientific = requirements of Mission to Planet Earth can be met by the private sector = and how the Administrator will meet those requirements which cannot be me= t by the private sector. =
What I have just described is not law...yet, but it is an indication of t= he mood of many in Congress to regard commercialization, i.e. acquisition= of data from the private sector, as the preferred solution for governmen= t data acquisition requirements. =
Prospects for Landsat 8
However, regarding post Landsat 7 systems, that preference is also stated=
in the 1992 law. References in the law to post Landsat 7 systems are co=
ntained in Title IV, "Assessing Options for Successor Land Remote Sensing=
Systems" The law calls upon Landsat Program Management to report to Con=
gress by October 1997 on options for a follow-on to Landsat 7. The repor=
t is required to include a "...full assessment of the advantages and disa=
dvantages of 1) private sector funding and management of a program; 2) c=
reating an international consortium for a follow-on system, 3) funding an=
d management of the system by the US government, and; 4) build and operat=
e a system through a cooperative effort between the US government and the=
private sector." The criteria for evaluating the options are also state=
d in the law as goals for the system. The follow-on to Landsat 7 should =
: 1) serve adequately the civilian, national security, commercial and for=
eign policy interests of the United States; 2) maintain data continuity w=
ith previous Landsats, and 3) include system enhancements that make the s=
ystem cheaper to build and operate and more responsive to user data requi=
rements. =
Section (c) of Title IV reads, "Preference for Private Sector System - If= a successor land remote sensing system to Landsat 7 can be funded and ma= naged by the private sector while still achieving the goals [stated above= ] without jeopardizing the domestic, national security, and foreign polic= y interests of the United States, preference should be given to the devel= opment of such a system by the private sector without competition from th= e United States Government." =
NASA, as part of LPM, is implementing Title IV of 1992 law and will make = recommendations on a successor to Landsat 7 by October, 1997. To begin ad= dressing the mandate of Title IV, NASA commissioned an assessment of opt= ions for "Landsat 8" based on the current state of land remote sensing fr= om space and the stated plans for new commercial and government sponsored= systems The report found that the primary demand for Landsat data, in t= erms of number of scenes, came from the global change science community. = In the next five years, a number of systems will provide data similar to= ETM+. That data may be more than adequate not only for the needs of the= science community but for all users of Landsat data. The report recomme= nded that the US government pursue purchase of data from the private sect= or to meet the need for Landsat-type data. If that option was not viable= , the purchase of a commercial instrument for operation by the government= combined with a commercially operated ground system and an international= consortium to share data would likely be the most efficient way to proce= ed. Regardless of the option chosen, the report recommended that NASA re= turn to its role of advanced technology development and retire from the r= esponsibility of maintaining an operational remote sensing system.
The report was one element of a comprehensive strategy toward fulfilling = the requirements of the law. (Other actions taken by NASA regarding a fo= llow on to Landsat 7 will be described on Thursday.) The report's recomme= ndations have neither been adopted, nor dismissed. The viability of comm= ercial systems has yet to be demonstrated. A data purchase has attractiv= e features, but that type of program has no successful precedent at any s= cale, let alone the quantity of data a Landsat-type data purchase may ent= ail. A crucial element in any data purchase will be the data policy, i.e= =2E, the rules for sale and redistribution of data after purchase. Who w= ill have access to the data purchased by the government? What will it co= st? How can it be used? The 1992 law found that commercialization of La= ndsat data was a failure because, in part, the cost of the data impeded d= istribution. What are the obligations of the US government to supply "lo= w cost" data, to what elements of the user community, and at what level o= f data processing? Should the concept of COFUR, explicit in the Landsat = 7 data policy, as required by law, be extended to the Landsat 7 follow -o= n? These issues will be addressed, directly or by default, in any optio= n selected for a post Landsat 7 system. =
Final Words
Four years after passage of the 1992 law, a robust, consistent policy for=
Landsat remains as elusive as ever. Nevertheless, the commitment to Lan=
dsat 7 remains intact. Currently, there are no initiatives in Congress o=
r the Administration to alter the manner in which Landsat 7 will collect,=
process, archive and distribute data. =
The picture after Landsat 7 is murky. Congress appears to favor a data p= urchase agreement or some solution that obviates the need for the governm= ent to build and operate new satellites. The dream of commercially avail= able, Landsat like, earth remote sensing data is alive but unfulfilled. = No fully commercial, space-based, earth observation system of any type ha= s yet been built, launched and operated successfully. But there are othe= r Landsat type instruments now acquiring data. Others are planned. Those= systems may provide all or part of a solution. The EOS program continue= s to plan for an instrument on AM-2 with ETM+ capabilities, but the natur= e of the instrument is undefined, and the promise of AM-2 may be another = unfulfilled dream. =
The report prepared for NASA on post Landsat 7 systems also recommended f= or further study establishing a process for refining and quantifying the = science requirements for a global land change archive and developing a pl= an for a global land change science institute. The recommendations were = made to help define the acquisition requirements for Landsat-type systems= and to establish an independent entity to assess how best to meet the re= quirements.
Those are two issues that may fall within the purview of this group. Una= mbiguous direction from the science community regarding collection of glo= bal data and evaluation of the interoperability and/or utility of data fr= om the public and private land remote sensing systems on orbit or planed = for operation in the next five years, would be a positive contribution to= ward a coherent, sustainable US policy for earth observations.
END