Sender: owner-biodiv-conv@igc.apc.org Subject: Biosafety Position Papers To: biodiv-conv@igc.apc.org X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.04 [en] (Win95; U) Status: RO X-Status: Attached please find two position papers regarding the upcoming meeting of the Working Group to negotiate a Biosafety Protocol under the CBD. First is a statement from the Australian GeneEthics Network and the second is from a coalition of German NGOs. <<>> Subject: Policy and Science Updates #6: The BioSafety Working Group Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1998 15:39:22 +1100 From: acfgenet@peg.apc.org (Bob Phelps) The Biosafety Protocol - Key Issues The Australian GeneEthics Network, August 1998 LMOs entering a country carry intrinsic risks regardless of their purported end uses - research, processing as commercial, industrial or agricultural commodities, or deliberate release to the environment. In Australia, the general problem of exotic organisms is exemplified by the hundreds of ornamental plants and animals which have become noxious and feral, creating environmental destruction and reducing biodiversity on a grand scale. LMOs pose similar hazards and new independent research has begun to show that LMOs may even present some unique hazards, such as persistent herbicide tolerance in weeds. We urge Australian negotiators at Biosafety Working Group Meetings to work for a Biosafety Protocol that makes the protection of global biodiversity its top priority. They should take a fully global, not parochial or nationalistic, view of biosafety precautions. The potential benefits of gene technology (which remain to be demonstrated) must not be gained by one section of the world community at the expense of the biodiversity, public health and disruption of other's societies. Trade is only one small part of the broad spectrum of socio-economic issues to be addressed matters and must not unduly influence the design of the Protocol. Unless the Protocol is fair and equitable in all respects it will fail, and that will be a loss for us all. 1. Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) Governments and citizens have the right to know what is coming into their countries so they can take precautionary measures to protect biodiversity, public health and their societies. Advance informed agreement (AIA) should apply to all transboundary movements of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). However, following the first AIA, including full assessment of a proposed LMO movement, the stringency of assessment and monitoring of subsequent movements should be at the sole discretion of the recipient state(s) and its citizens. The Protocol ought to particularly mandate AIA for high risk movements, such as the transfer of LMO's into regions of high biodiversity value, such as centres of origin or biological megadiversity, and movements to states which have minimal technical or scientific capacity to assess or regulate such flows. Proponents should be obliged to notify the Clearing House and the recipient State of any material changes following the initial assessment - such as alterations to the genetic makeup of the LMO, stringency of containment or handling procedures, and end uses. We reject proposals to limit the scope of the protocol to the transboundary movement of LMOs for the sole purpose of 'deliberate release' to the environment. Commodity movements, likely to be one of the most significant mechanisms for the transboundary movement of LMO's, must be covered by AIA. They include many viable LMOs which are traded as commodities - food, fibre, fodder, and industrial materials - including those to be used for 'contained' or 'confined' uses. The AIA system must ensure the notification of such LMO movements so assessment and monitoring can occur, to prevent spills or releases during transport or use. This must apply whether the LMOs are co-mingled with conventional commodities or not. An example is the Roundup Ready soybeans, mixed with conventional beans, being imported into Australia from the USA for processing into human and animal food products. This activity should continue to fall under AQIS regulation, to ensure that no viable seeds or other self-replicating entities are released to the environment. Monitoring for illegal Roundup residues should also be mandated. The Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee and ANZFA must also be notified. The proposed Australian GTO is still not established and its rules are not yet in the public domain for discussion. Australia's delegation therefore has no mandate to argue that AIA mechanisms can be watered down or bypassed in favour of fast-tracking LMOs through the precautionary Clearing House system needed to protect Biodiversity. 2. Obligations of Exporters The national Government of the Party of Export of an LMO should be required to enact laws mandating their researchers and corporations to follow the AIA procedure established by the Protocol. LMO movement should not be permitted under the laws of the Party of Export until the explicit consent of the Party of Import has been received by the Responsible Authority within the Exporting Party. This is similar to a requirement of the Prior Informed Consent provisions of the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes. 3. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements The Protocol should preclude any exemptions from the Protocol's AIA requirements that would allow Parties to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements to permit movements of LMO's outside AIA requirements. Such exemptions would undermine the Protocol's comprehensiveness, and may facilitate many transboundary movements which were not subject to the Protocol's requirements to report to the Clearinghouse, other countries, and the public. Developing countries may be particularly vulnerable to economic and political pressure to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements, and to surrender their rights to fully assess, monitor or refuse import proposals on LMOs. 4. Trade with Non-Parties to the Protocol A ban on trade in LMOs between Parties and non-Parties is most desirable, especially to encourage all countries wanting to transfer or receive LMOs to become Parties to the Protocol. However, a complete ban on trade in LMO's with non-parties to the Protocol may not be achievable. The United States Senate seems so committed to the reckless fast-tracking of its industrial gene technology products that it is unlikely to ratify the Protocol, regardless of its degree of stringency. Moreover, the US is not a signatory to the Biodiversity Convention. However, as the USA is the biggest exporter of LMOs and commodities containing them, it is highly desirable that the USA and its corporations are somehow bound by the provisions of the Biosafety Protocol. We therefore propose that trade between Parties and non-Parties be permitted in a limited number of specified instances through bilateral agreements, but the Protocol must require that such agreements include ALL the rules, requirements and conditions of the Protocol. 5. Consideration of Socio-Economic impacts under a Biosafety Protocol The Protocol should allow Parties to refuse the importation of LMOs on the grounds of likely negative social, economic, or cultural impacts on their societies. This view is advocated by most developing countries, and public interest NGOs from the north and south. The negotiation of a robust and effective Protocol depends on all countries, regardless of their levels of material affluence and specialised expertise, being empowered to protect their biodiversity and public health. Societies in disarray because of the socio-economic impacts of LMOs would be unable to effectively regulate such agents or fulfil the terms of the Protocol. Provision in the Protocol to ameliorate the impacts of socio-economic factors is opposed by OECD countries, most notably the United States, Australia and Japan. They base their rejection of socio-economic factors on a perceived potential to hamper free trade. But free trade concerns are pre-eminently an aspect of the socio-economic system. These affluent countries simply want to pick and choose which aspects of the socio-economic system they will acknowledge in negotiating the Protocol. Their motto is "Hang the cost and the devil take the hindmost". Australian delegates should take a more balanced view and support provisions in the Protocol that would permit Parties to choose which LMOs to allow, based on the full diversity of national and international socio-economic or cultural considerations. This is appropriate because: … Introduced LMOs may threaten traditional crops, products, or practices, critical to the conservation of biological diversity. The Biodiversity Convention itself acknowledges this possibility and requires Parties to the Convention to respect, preserve and maintain "knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity" (Article 8 (j)). … The national autonomy and sovereignty of Parties and their citizens are threatened. They must have the right to reject LMOs that will harm their social or cultural well-being, indigenous cultures or communities, or affront their ethical, philosophical or religious understandings. Paragraph 7 (f) of Annex 2 of the Ethiopian draft Protocol, endorsed by many other African states and public interest NGOs, correctly drew attention to the "possible effects which are contrary to the social, cultural, ethical and religious values of communities arising from the use or release of the living modified organism or the product thereof." Australia should not foreclose any options that address ethical and socio-economic issues on LMOs and the technology to produce them. The Protocol should permit Parties to consider and act on all such factors when assessing and monitoring proposals for LMO imports. Technocratic risk assessments are altogether too simplistic and partial as a basis for assessing biosafety, particularly in light of the emerging evidence from animal studies that LMOs can have profound public health and environmental impacts. <<>> Subject: Biosafety Verhandlungen Montreal Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1998 15:13:47 +0200 From: forum.ue@t-online.de (forum.ue) Biosafety Protocol Key Demands by German Environment and Development NGOs Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung (German NGO Forum Environment & Development) Greenpeace Germany BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany) NABU (BirdLife Germany) BSWG - 5 Montreal, Canada August 17 - 29, 1998 Since May 1997, negotiations on a legally binding biosafety protocol to assess and minimize risks in the field of transfer, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs), specifically focusing on transboundary movements, are taking place in Montreal, Canada. The Montreal negotiations are based on Articles 19.3 and 8(g) of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and on Decision II/5 of the Second Conference of the Parties in Jakarta. Germany committed itself to implementing these articles by ratifying the CBD on 21 December 1993 and adopting the unanimous Jakarta Decisions on 17 November 1995. At the outset of the biosafety process, the German government and its Minister of the Environment responsible for the CBD, Dr. Merkel, saw no possibility of negotiating internationally valid and binding regulations on biosafety. In Jakarta, Dr. Merkel stressed: "What use are hard German standards in the negotiations if then nobody ratifies them? We can not, after all, dictate conditions to the others." Instead, she pleaded for voluntary agreements. Dr. Merkel's reservations that German environmental and health standards will not be accepted in international negotiations are unfounded at least since the African Group and Asian Parties such as Malaysia and Indonesia elaborated detailed drafts for a strict biosafety protocol adequate for the protection of biodiversity and of human health. These drafts, presented at the 2nd session of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety (BSWG, 12-16 May 1997 - an institutional body of the CBD), contain provisions that not only do justice to the relevant CBD Articles and COP Decisions but also move beyond the obligations of some Northern regulations, e.g. the German Gene Technology Act since they explicitly call for the inclusion of social and economic considerations into risk assessment procedures. The drafts are based on the scientific and political understanding that risk assessment on the production and use of transgenic organisms and their products carried out in industrialised countries can not automatically apply to developing countries. The transboundary transport of LMOs and their products means that their subsequent handling and use takes place under ecological, economic and social framework conditions that were not the subject of previous risk analyses. German environment and development organizations have closely followed the biosafety process since 1992, and support the negotiation position of the above-mentioned Parties. During BSWG-4 (5-13 February 1998), all delegations of G77/China spoke out in favour of establishing binding environmental and health standards in an international protocol under the CBD. The undersigning NGOs call upon the German government to respect and support this position. The present opinion lists the views and demands that the German environment and development organizations support and intend to raise at BSWG-5 (17-28 August 1998). I We demand strong efforts in negotiating the following general provisions: I.1 Negotiation of the scope of application on the basis of CBD Articles 19.3 and 8 (g) and of COP Decision II/5, in particular * transboundary transfer, handling and use of LMOs and products thereof (Art. 19.3 CBD), * assessment of the negative impacts upon the conservation and use of biological diversity within and outside of protected areas (Arts. 2; 8 CBD), * assessment of negative impacts upon human health (Art. 8 (g) CBD, Jakarta Mandate II/5). I.2 Referring to European legislation such as the EU Treaty, the Directive 90/220/EEC (deliberate releases) and the amendments to the EU Treaty of the June 1997 Amsterdam Summit which make explicit provisions for environmental protection requirements to be integrated into all policies and activities of the Community and its member Parties, the precautionary principle must be included in the preamble and in all relevant Articles of the biosafety protocol (in particular Arts. 1 and 6), ensuring the * application of the precautionary principle as the overriding principle in the implementation of the Protocol, * application of the precautionary principle where there is a lack of knowledge or where the basis of decision-making processes is insecure (Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration). I.3 Inclusion of an article regulating liability and compensation procedures in case of damages to biodiversity (decision IV/10 CBD), to human or animal health, to the environment and to socio-economic welfare. 1.4 Inclusion of all parts of a LMO and products thereof that could potentially transfer modified DNA to other organisms into the definition of LMO. Sterile LMOs (terminator technology, male sterility) must fall under the definition. I.5 Comprehensive estimation and risk assessment. * Responsibility for the supply of information needed for the risk assessment by the importing Party shall be with the exporting Party (Art. 19.4 CBD), * environmental impact assessment (Art. 14 CBD), * participation of local and indigenous communities in risk assessment (Art. 8 (j) CBD). I.6 Chain-of-custody labelling of LMOs and products thereof as a necessary precondition to the advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure in order to secure options for risk management and monitoring. * Inclusion of corresponding requirements in the Codex Alimentarius negotiations. I.7 Inclusion of all Annexes in the legally binding status of the Protocol. II We demand the following provisions for the Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure II.1 Application of the AIA procedure to all LMOs without restriction. II.2 Establishment of the "no import without approval" principle. II.3 Risk analysis with due consideration to the impacts of transboundary transfer, handling and use of LMOs and products thereof, examining ecological, including negative impact on ecological and socio-economic factors that promote the protection and sustainable use of biological diversity. II.4 Inclusion of the step-by-step (research - small-scale release - variety trials - cultivation) and case-by-case principles (variety differences - simple/multiple transgenic plants - differential regulation of transgenes) in risk analysis. II.5 AIA procedure for the first and for all subsequent transfers of LMOs. II.6 Information of all neighbouring states as a requirement of the AIA procedure. II.7 Sovereign power of the importing states on the decision whether simplified procedures will be applied (Art. 29 CBD). II.8 Requirement for bi- and multilateral agreements to at least correspond to the level of protection established by the entire Protocol. II.9 A timeframe for AIA procedure which - whilst not allowing unjustified delays - ensures the availability of time for the completion of an adequate risk assessment. III We demand unambiguous positions concerning trade-related issues III.1 Precedence of CBD, if commitments or obligations under other agreements pose serious threats to biodiversity (Art. 22.1 CBD), negotiating positions in the upcoming WTO negotiations consistent and in accordance with this vital precedence. III.2 No comparative advantage for non-party states. IV We further demand IV.1 A worldwide moratorium on transboundary transport, handling and use of LMOs and products thereof until a biosafety protocol is in force which establishes conservation of biological diversity and its sustainable use as well as health precautions by implementing the precautionary principle as the guiding principle of risk analysis and approval procedures. IV.2 Allocation of funds to create and make use of interdisciplinary knowledge (social and life sciences) on biosafety in recognition of the fact that biosafety expertise goes far beyond the narrow field of gene technology expertise; hence inclusion and promotion of knowledge on the conservation of biodiversity and on human health. IV.3 The German government should support the Trust Fund in order to ensure participation of developing countries in all relevant meetings of BSWG in August 1998 and February 1999. Relevant literature on a biosafety protocol Glowka L, Burhenne-Guilmin F, Syngne H, McNeely J, Gündling L A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30 Gland [et al.], IUCN, 161 p., 1994 Weizsäcker Cv Gentechnik und Artenvielfalt In: Wolters J (Hrsg), Leben und Leben lassen Ökozid 10, Jahrbuch für Ökologie und Indigene Völker, Gießen, Ökozid e.V., pp. 53-68, 1995 World Wide Fund For Nature Genetic Engineering - Examples of Ecological Effects and Inherent Uncertainties, Geneva, WWF, 1995 Egziabher TBG, Asfaw Z Socio-Economic Considerations Including Issues of Liability and Compensation, Paper 13, Workshop Transboundary Movement of Living Modified Organisms Resulting from Modern Biotechnology: Issues and Opportunities for Policy Makers, Geneva, International Academy for the Environment, 11 p., 1996 Leskien D Die Verhandlungen um das internationale Biosafety-Projekt In: Sprenger U, Knirsch J, Lanje K (Hrsg), Unternehmen Zweite Natur Ökozid 12, Jahrbuch für Ökologie und Indigene Völker Gießen, Ökozid e.V., pp. 74-86, 1996 Third World Network Biosafety - Scientific Findings and Elements of a Protocol, Penang, TWN, 93 p., 1996 Friends of the Earth Europe, BUND International Biosafety-Workshop Proceedings, Brussels, FoEE, 87 p., 1997 Nijar GS Liability and Compensation in a Biosafety Protocol, Penang, TWN, 22 p., 1997 Greenpeace International Key Elements for the International Biosafety Protocol, Brussels, GPI, 21 p., 1998 Meyer H, Leskien D, Tappeser B, Weizsäcker Cv Das Biosafety Protocol, Bonn, Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung, in print These demands are endorsed by * BUND (Friends of the Earth, Germany), Bonn * Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung (German NGO Forum on Environment & Development), Bonn * Greenpeace Germany, Hamburg * Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU - BirdLife Germany), Bonn Further information: Dr. Hartmut Meyer (Forum U&E) Reinhäuser Landstrasse 51 37083 Göttingen Telephone: +49-551-7700027 Fax: +49-551-7701672 Email: h.meyer@kreiter.goe.shuttle.de