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Attached please find two position papers regarding the upcoming meeting
of the Working Group to negotiate a Biosafety Protocol under the CBD.
First is a statement from the Australian GeneEthics Network and the
second is from a coalition of German NGOs.

<<>>

Subject: Policy and Science Updates #6: The BioSafety Working Group
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 1998 15:39:22 +1100
From: acfgenet@peg.apc.org (Bob Phelps)

The Biosafety Protocol - Key Issues
The Australian GeneEthics Network, August 1998

LMOs entering a country carry intrinsic risks regardless of their
purported end uses - research, processing as commercial, industrial or
agricultural commodities, or deliberate release to the environment. In
Australia, the general problem of exotic organisms is exemplified by the
hundreds of ornamental plants and animals which have become noxious and
feral, creating environmental destruction and reducing biodiversity on a
grand scale. LMOs pose similar hazards and new independent research has
begun to show that LMOs may even present some unique hazards, such as
persistent herbicide tolerance in weeds.

We urge Australian negotiators at Biosafety Working Group Meetings to
work for a Biosafety Protocol that makes the protection of global
biodiversity its top priority. They should take a fully global, not
parochial or nationalistic, view of biosafety precautions.

The potential benefits of gene technology (which remain to be
demonstrated) must not be gained by one section of the world community
at the expense of the biodiversity, public health and disruption of
other's societies. Trade is only one small part of the broad spectrum of
socio-economic issues to be addressed matters and must not unduly
influence the design of the Protocol. Unless the Protocol is fair and
equitable in all respects it will fail, and that will be a loss for us
all.

1. Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA)

Governments and citizens have the right to know what is coming into
their countries so they can take precautionary measures to protect
biodiversity, public health and their societies.

Advance informed agreement (AIA) should apply to all transboundary
movements of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). However, following the
first AIA, including full assessment of a proposed LMO movement, the
stringency of assessment and monitoring of subsequent movements should
be at the sole discretion of the recipient state(s) and its citizens.

The Protocol ought to particularly mandate AIA for high risk movements,
such as the transfer of LMO's into regions of high biodiversity value,
such as centres of origin or biological megadiversity, and movements to
states which have minimal technical or scientific capacity to assess or
regulate such flows.

Proponents should be obliged to notify the Clearing House and the
recipient State of any material changes following the initial assessment
- such as alterations to the genetic makeup of the LMO, stringency of
containment or handling procedures, and end uses.

We reject proposals to limit the scope of the protocol to the
transboundary movement of LMOs for the sole purpose of 'deliberate
release' to the environment. Commodity movements, likely to be one of
the most significant mechanisms for the transboundary movement of LMO's,
must be covered by AIA. They include many viable LMOs which are traded
as commodities - food, fibre, fodder, and industrial materials -
including those to be used for 'contained' or 'confined' uses. The AIA
system must ensure the notification of such LMO movements so assessment
and monitoring can occur, to prevent spills or releases during transport
or use.

This must apply whether the LMOs are co-mingled with conventional
commodities or not. An example is the Roundup Ready soybeans, mixed with
conventional beans, being imported into Australia from the USA for
processing into human and animal food products. This activity should
continue to fall under AQIS regulation, to ensure that no viable seeds
or other self-replicating entities are released to the environment.
Monitoring for illegal Roundup residues should also be mandated. The
Genetic Manipulation Advisory Committee and ANZFA must also be notified.

The proposed Australian GTO is still not established and its rules are
not yet in the public domain for discussion. Australia's delegation
therefore has no mandate to argue that AIA mechanisms can be watered
down or bypassed in favour of fast-tracking LMOs through the
precautionary Clearing House system needed to protect Biodiversity.

2. Obligations of Exporters

The national Government of the Party of Export of an LMO should be
required to enact laws mandating their researchers and corporations to
follow the AIA procedure established by the Protocol. LMO movement
should not be permitted under the laws of the Party of Export until the
explicit consent of the Party of Import has been received by the
Responsible Authority within the Exporting Party. This is similar to a
requirement of the Prior Informed Consent provisions of the Basel
Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes.

 3. Bilateral and Multilateral Agreements

The Protocol should preclude any exemptions from the Protocol's AIA
requirements that would allow Parties to enter into bilateral or
multilateral agreements to permit movements of LMO's outside AIA
requirements. Such exemptions would undermine the Protocol's
comprehensiveness, and may facilitate many transboundary movements which
were not subject to the Protocol's requirements to report to the
Clearinghouse, other countries, and the public.

Developing countries may be particularly vulnerable to economic and
political pressure to enter into bilateral or multilateral agreements,
and to surrender their rights to fully assess, monitor or refuse import
proposals on LMOs.

 4. Trade with Non-Parties to the Protocol

A ban on trade in LMOs between Parties and non-Parties is most
desirable, especially to encourage all countries wanting to transfer or
receive LMOs to become Parties to the Protocol.

However, a complete ban on trade in LMO's with non-parties to the
Protocol may not be achievable. The United States Senate seems so
committed to the reckless fast-tracking of its industrial gene
technology products that it is unlikely to ratify the Protocol,
regardless of its degree of stringency. Moreover, the US is not a
signatory to the Biodiversity Convention. 

However, as the USA is the biggest exporter of LMOs and commodities
containing them, it is highly desirable that the USA and its
corporations are somehow bound by the provisions of the Biosafety
Protocol.

We therefore propose that trade between Parties and non-Parties be
permitted in a limited number of specified instances through bilateral
agreements, but the Protocol must require that such agreements include
ALL the rules, requirements and conditions of the Protocol.

 5. Consideration of Socio-Economic impacts under a Biosafety Protocol

The Protocol should allow Parties to refuse the importation of LMOs on
the grounds of likely negative social, economic, or cultural impacts on
their societies. This view is advocated by most developing countries,
and public interest NGOs from the north and south. The negotiation of a
robust and effective Protocol depends on all countries, regardless of
their levels of material affluence and specialised expertise, being
empowered to protect their biodiversity and public health. Societies in
disarray because of the socio-economic impacts of LMOs would be unable
to effectively regulate such agents or fulfil the terms of the Protocol.

Provision in the Protocol to ameliorate the impacts of socio-economic
factors is opposed by OECD countries, most notably the United States,
Australia and Japan. They base their rejection of socio-economic factors
on a perceived potential to hamper free trade. But free trade concerns
are pre-eminently an aspect of the socio-economic system. These affluent
countries simply want to pick and choose which aspects of the
socio-economic system they will acknowledge in negotiating the Protocol.
Their motto is "Hang the cost and the devil take the hindmost".

Australian delegates should take a more balanced view and support
provisions in the Protocol that would permit Parties to choose which
LMOs to allow, based on the full diversity of national and international
socio-economic or cultural considerations. This is appropriate because:

… Introduced LMOs may threaten traditional crops, products, or
practices, critical to the conservation of biological diversity. The
Biodiversity Convention itself acknowledges this possibility and
requires Parties to the Convention to respect, preserve and maintain
"knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity" (Article 8
(j)).

… The national autonomy and sovereignty of Parties and their citizens
are threatened. They must have the right to reject LMOs that will harm
their social or cultural well-being, indigenous cultures or communities,
or affront their ethical, philosophical or religious understandings.
Paragraph 7 (f) of Annex 2 of the Ethiopian draft Protocol, endorsed by
many other African states and public interest NGOs, correctly drew
attention to the "possible effects which are contrary to the social,
cultural, ethical and religious values of communities arising from the
use or release of the living modified organism or the product thereof."

Australia should not foreclose any options that address ethical and
socio-economic issues on LMOs and the technology to produce them. The
Protocol should permit Parties to consider and act on all such factors
when assessing and monitoring proposals for LMO imports.

Technocratic risk assessments are altogether too simplistic and partial
as a basis for assessing biosafety, particularly in light of the
emerging evidence from animal studies that LMOs can have profound public
health and environmental impacts.

<<>>

Subject: Biosafety Verhandlungen Montreal
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1998 15:13:47 +0200
From: forum.ue@t-online.de (forum.ue)

Biosafety Protocol

Key Demands 

by German Environment and Development NGOs

Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung
(German NGO Forum Environment & Development)
Greenpeace Germany
BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany)
NABU (BirdLife Germany)


BSWG - 5
Montreal, Canada
August 17 - 29, 1998

Since May 1997, negotiations on a legally binding biosafety protocol to
assess and minimize risks in the field of transfer, handling and use of
living modified organisms (LMOs), specifically focusing on transboundary
movements, are taking place in Montreal, Canada. The Montreal
negotiations are based on Articles 19.3 and 8(g) of the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) and on Decision II/5 of the Second Conference
of the Parties in Jakarta. Germany committed itself to implementing
these articles by ratifying the CBD on 21 December 1993 and adopting the
unanimous Jakarta Decisions on 17 November 1995. 

At the outset of the biosafety process, the German government and its
Minister of the Environment responsible for the CBD, Dr. Merkel, saw no
possibility of negotiating internationally valid and binding regulations
on biosafety. In Jakarta, Dr. Merkel stressed: "What use are hard German
standards in the negotiations if then nobody ratifies them? We can not,
after all, dictate conditions to the others." Instead, she pleaded for
voluntary agreements.

Dr. Merkel's reservations that German environmental and health standards
will not be accepted in international negotiations are unfounded at
least since the African Group and Asian Parties such as Malaysia and
Indonesia elaborated detailed drafts for a strict biosafety protocol
adequate for the protection of biodiversity and of human health. These
drafts, presented at the 2nd session of the Open-ended Ad Hoc Working
Group on Biosafety (BSWG, 12-16 May 1997 - an institutional body of the
CBD), contain provisions that not only do justice to the relevant CBD
Articles and COP Decisions but also move beyond the obligations of some
Northern regulations, e.g. the German Gene Technology Act since they 
explicitly call for the inclusion of social and economic considerations
into risk assessment procedures.

The drafts are based on the scientific and political understanding that
risk assessment on the production and use of transgenic organisms and
their products carried out in industrialised countries can not
automatically apply to developing countries. The transboundary transport
of LMOs and their products means that their subsequent handling and use
takes place under ecological, economic and social framework conditions
that were not the subject of previous risk analyses.

German environment and development organizations have closely followed
the biosafety process since 1992, and support the negotiation position
of the above-mentioned Parties. During BSWG-4 (5-13 February 1998), all
delegations of G77/China spoke out in favour of establishing binding
environmental and health standards in an international protocol under
the CBD. The undersigning NGOs call upon the German government to
respect and support this position. The present opinion lists the views
and demands that the German environment and development organizations
support and intend to raise at BSWG-5 (17-28 August 1998).

I We demand strong efforts in negotiating the following general
provisions:

I.1 Negotiation of the scope of application on the basis of CBD Articles
19.3 and 8 (g) and of COP Decision II/5, in particular
* transboundary transfer, handling and use of LMOs and products thereof
(Art. 19.3 CBD),
* assessment of the negative impacts upon the conservation and use of
biological diversity within and outside of protected areas (Arts. 2; 8
CBD),
* assessment of negative impacts upon human health (Art. 8 (g) CBD,
Jakarta Mandate II/5).

 I.2 Referring to European legislation such as the EU Treaty, the
Directive 90/220/EEC (deliberate releases) and the amendments to the EU
Treaty of the June 1997 Amsterdam Summit which make explicit provisions
for environmental protection requirements to be integrated into all
policies and activities of the Community and its member Parties, the
precautionary principle must be included in the preamble and in all
relevant Articles of the biosafety protocol (in particular Arts. 1 and
6), ensuring the
* application of the precautionary principle as the overriding 
principle in the implementation of the Protocol, 
* application of the precautionary principle where there is a lack of
knowledge or where the basis of decision-making processes is insecure
(Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration).

I.3 Inclusion of an article regulating liability and compensation
procedures in case of damages to biodiversity (decision IV/10 CBD), to
human or animal health, to the environment and to socio-economic
welfare.
 
1.4 Inclusion of all parts of a LMO and products thereof that could
potentially transfer modified DNA to other organisms into the definition
of LMO. Sterile LMOs (terminator technology, male sterility) must fall
under the definition.

I.5 Comprehensive estimation and risk assessment.
* Responsibility for the supply of information needed for the risk
assessment by the importing Party shall be with the exporting Party
(Art. 19.4 CBD),
* environmental impact assessment (Art. 14 CBD),
* participation of local and indigenous communities in risk assessment
(Art. 8 (j) CBD).

I.6 Chain-of-custody labelling of LMOs and products thereof as a
necessary precondition to the advance informed agreement (AIA) procedure
in order to secure options for risk management and monitoring.
* Inclusion of corresponding requirements in the Codex Alimentarius 
negotiations.

I.7 Inclusion of all Annexes in the legally binding status of the
Protocol.
 
II We demand the following provisions for the Advance Informed Agreement
(AIA) procedure
 
II.1 Application of the AIA procedure to all LMOs without restriction.

II.2 Establishment of the "no import without approval" principle.

II.3 Risk analysis with due consideration to the impacts of
transboundary transfer, handling and use of LMOs and products thereof,
examining ecological, including negative impact on ecological and
socio-economic factors that promote the protection and sustainable use
of biological diversity.

II.4 Inclusion of the step-by-step (research - small-scale release -
variety trials - cultivation) and case-by-case principles (variety
differences - simple/multiple transgenic plants - differential
regulation of transgenes) in risk analysis.

II.5 AIA procedure for the first and for all subsequent transfers of
LMOs.

II.6 Information of all neighbouring states as a requirement of the AIA 
procedure.

II.7 Sovereign power of the importing states on the decision whether
simplified procedures will be applied (Art. 29 CBD).

II.8 Requirement for bi- and multilateral agreements to at least
correspond to the level of protection established by the entire
Protocol.

II.9 A timeframe for AIA procedure which - whilst not allowing
unjustified delays - ensures the availability of time for the completion
of an adequate risk assessment.
 
III We demand unambiguous positions concerning trade-related issues
 
III.1 Precedence of CBD, if commitments or obligations under other
agreements pose serious threats to biodiversity (Art. 22.1 CBD),
negotiating positions in the upcoming WTO negotiations consistent and in
accordance with this vital precedence.

III.2 No comparative advantage for non-party states.
 
IV We further demand
 
IV.1 A worldwide moratorium on transboundary transport, handling and use
of LMOs and products thereof until a biosafety protocol is in force
which establishes conservation of biological diversity and its
sustainable use as well as health precautions by implementing the
precautionary principle as the guiding principle of risk analysis and
approval procedures.

IV.2 Allocation of funds to create and make use of interdisciplinary
knowledge (social and life sciences) on biosafety in recognition of the
fact that biosafety expertise goes far beyond the narrow field of gene
technology expertise; hence inclusion and promotion of knowledge on the
conservation of biodiversity and on human health.

IV.3 The German government should support the Trust Fund in order to
ensure participation of developing countries in all relevant meetings of
BSWG in August 1998 and February 1999.

 Relevant literature on a biosafety protocol
 
Glowka L, Burhenne-Guilmin F, Syngne H, McNeely J, Gündling L
A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30
Gland [et al.], IUCN, 161 p., 1994
 
Weizsäcker Cv
Gentechnik und Artenvielfalt
In: Wolters J (Hrsg), Leben und Leben lassen
Ökozid 10, Jahrbuch für Ökologie und Indigene Völker, Gießen, Ökozid
e.V., pp. 53-68, 1995
 
World Wide Fund For Nature
Genetic Engineering - Examples of Ecological Effects and Inherent 
Uncertainties, Geneva, WWF, 1995
 
Egziabher TBG, Asfaw Z
Socio-Economic Considerations Including Issues of Liability and
Compensation, Paper 13, Workshop Transboundary Movement of Living
Modified Organisms Resulting from Modern Biotechnology: Issues and
Opportunities for Policy Makers, Geneva, International Academy for the
Environment, 11 p., 1996
 
Leskien D
Die Verhandlungen um das internationale Biosafety-Projekt
In: Sprenger U, Knirsch J, Lanje K (Hrsg), Unternehmen Zweite Natur
Ökozid 12, Jahrbuch für Ökologie und Indigene Völker Gießen, Ökozid
e.V., pp. 74-86, 1996

Third World Network
Biosafety - Scientific Findings and Elements of a Protocol, Penang, TWN,
93 p., 
1996
 
Friends of the Earth Europe, BUND
International Biosafety-Workshop Proceedings, Brussels, FoEE, 87 p.,
1997
 
Nijar GS
Liability and Compensation in a Biosafety Protocol, Penang, TWN, 22 p.,
1997
 
Greenpeace International
Key Elements for the International Biosafety Protocol, Brussels, GPI, 21
p., 1998
 
Meyer H, Leskien D, Tappeser B, Weizsäcker Cv
Das Biosafety Protocol, Bonn, Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung, in print
 
These demands are endorsed by
* BUND (Friends of the Earth, Germany), Bonn
* Forum Umwelt & Entwicklung (German NGO Forum on Environment &
Development), Bonn
* Greenpeace Germany, Hamburg
* Naturschutzbund Deutschland (NABU - BirdLife Germany), Bonn

Further information:
Dr. Hartmut Meyer (Forum U&E) 
Reinhäuser Landstrasse 51
37083 Göttingen
Telephone: +49-551-7700027   Fax: +49-551-7701672
Email: h.meyer@kreiter.goe.shuttle.de